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I. UTAH CASE LAW SUPPORTS PETITIONER'S POSITION ON 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE STATUTORY 
LANGUAGE "ACQUIRED ALL OR SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF THE 
ASSETS OF ANOTHER EMPLOYER". 
The only Utah case cited in Respondent's Brief supports 
Petitioner's position of interpretation and application of the. 
controlling statute in question on this appeal. It also 
establishes that the issue which is the basis of this appeal is 
one of statutory interpretation and fully reviewable by this 
court and is not simply a question of fact as Respondent would 
have the Court believe. In Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Utah 
v. Board of Review, Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of 
Employment Security, 118 Utah 657, 223 P.2d 586 (1950) this Court 
said that there is "certainly . . . nothing indefinite or 
uncertain about the words, '. . .an employer has acquired all or 
substantially all of the assets of another employer . . . ' " . Id 
at 590. The Court accepted and applied their "everyday usage" in 
determining that "when a going business is carved roughly into 
quarters, three-fourths goes to one successor corporation and 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF 
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one-fourth to another, neither of the succeeding entities 
acquires substantially all of its predecessor's assets". Id at 
590. 
Although in Canada Dry Bottling the interpretation of the 
Court worked to deny Petitioner a favorable inheritance rate, it 
seems that what is good for the goose should be good for the 
gander. In the case at bar Petitioner seeks not a favorable 
inheritance rate, but to avoid an unfavorable inheritance rate. 
In Canada Dry Bottling the Court determined that a successor 
employer to one-fourth and three-fourths, respectively, of a 
discontinued going business was "neither of the succeeding 
entities acquired substantially all of its predecessor's 
assets". Id at 590. Therefore, it appears that "substantially 
all" should be something more chan chree-fourths of the assats of 
the acquired business. 
In this case, as found by the Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ), Petitioner purchased only approximately 30% of the 
assets. R.0022. Even after the ALJ erroneously valued a two 
year lease on the office building as being the fair market value 
of the property, it is clear from the Conclusions of Law (R.0023) 
that Petitioner at most "acquired approximately 75% of 
Dr. Larson's practice". I_d. Even should the Court refuse to 
find an inherent defect in the ALJ's valuation and calculations 
as set forth in his Conclusions, under the Canada Dry Bottling 
Rule, 7 5*6 should not be considered all or substantially all of 
the assets of the transferring employer. 
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II. PARAGRAPH 4 OF SECTION 3 5-4-7(c)(I)(C), UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, IS NOT APPLICABLE TO 
THE BUSINESS IN QUESTION. 
Respondent would like the Court to believe that paragraph 4 
of Section 35-4-7(c)(1)(C) authorizes the Department to treat 
any real property assets of one business entity as a "segregable 
and identifiable" sub-business entity, therefore, justifying the 
Department's refusal, after the fact in this case, to take into 
account the transferring employer's retention of his office 
building in figuring the total assets acquired by Petitioner. 
A careful reading of Canada Dry Bottling indicates that 
the paragraph 4 cited below was not enacted at that time and that 
its terms were intended for businesses with clearly segregable 
business activities, such as one company owning both a bottling 
plant and bowling alleys. Those two business activities are 
clearly segregable, can be sold separately, and have separate and 
easily identifiable employment histories which can be separately 
assigned. 
when an employer or prospective employer has acquired 
an operating department, section, division, or any 
substantial portion of the business or assets of any 
employer which is clearly segregable and identifiable, 
the entire payroll experience, and benefit costs after 
January 1, 1985, of the transferring employer shall be 
divided between the transferring and acquiring 
employers in proportion to the payroll for the four 
preceding completed calendar quarters attributable to 
the operating assets conveyed and retained. . . . 
This paragraph is not applicable to a dental practice such as the 
Petitioner's where there are no departments, sections, divisions 
or segregable parts. In fact, the real essence of the dental 
practice is the employer's ability to sell his service, without 
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his service he has no business. A dental practice is unlike a 
retail furniture business, for example, as in the case of 
Union-May-Stern Company v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, 27 3 
S.W.2d 766 (1954). Generally, retail businesses and 
manufacturers, for example have certain product lines which 
are offered to the public and transfer of ownership of the 
business has very little to do with consumer activity, at least 
in the short range after a transfer. Dental patients, however, 
really change business allegiance when they change dentists, 
whether the dentist uses the same equipment and leases the same 
office building as the patient's former dentist and, patients are 
just as likely to change to a dentist in a different locale than 
to continue based solely on a letter of introduction from one's 
former dentist. Any retainage by Petitioner of Dr. Larson's 
patients was due solely to his own efforts and was not a result 
of any benefits acquired through purchase. 
III. THE ALJ NEVER CONSIDERED THE TRANSFER OF THE 
BUSINESS TO BE ANYTHING OTHER THAN A COMPLETE 
TRANSFER AND SIMPLY ERRED IN HIS VALUATION. 
The Respondent claims in its Brief on page 12 that a careful 
reading of the ALJ's decision shows that it reflects the 
application of the statutory standard under paragraph 4 of the 
statute. This is clearly not true. Nowhere in the ALJ's 
Findings and Conclusions does he refer to departments, sections, 
divisions or segregable or identifiable parts. 
It is clear on the other hand that the ALJ simply tried to 
use a fair market value of Dr. Larson's office building as the 
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value of the two year lease which Petitioner signed with Larson, 
thereby inflating the dollar values of assets acquired so that it 
would appear that Petitioner acquired a larger portion of 
Larson's business assets than reality reflects. 
IV. THE HIGHLY PERSONAL AND CLOSED NATURE OF A DENTAL 
PRACTICE, BY DEFINITION SHOULD QUALIFY IT AS A 
"NEW BUSINESS" RATHER THAN A SUCCESSOR BUSINESS. 
Based on the points raised in the last paragraph of Argument 
II of this Reply Brief, the very nature of a solo dental practice 
should disqualify it from being categorized as a business able to 
be transferred for purposes of joint wage experience consider-
ation of employment contribution and history. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the record that the ALJ erred in his 
valuation of assets transferred. Even if his valuation is close 
to being accurate, the clear, everyday meaning of "all or 
substantially all" would not justify joint wage experience 
considerations in this case. As has been championed by the 
Respondent in its Brief, cases such as this should be viewed on a 
case by case basis taking into account the particular facts of 
each. Petitioner believes that if the Court will consider the 
facts as they apply to a rational interpretation of the language 
of the law, including the peculiar nature of a solo dental 
practice and the strict construction principal against taxing 
authorities as set out in Continental Telephone Co- of Utah 
v. State Tax Comm., 539 P.2d 447 (1975), that it must rule in 
Petitioner's favor. 
DATED this 18th day of February, 1986. 
DAINES & KANE 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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